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n 2001, Jeremy Bloom postponed one childhood
dream to pursue another when he deferred enrolling at the
University of Colorado at Boulder (hereinafter "CU") on a
football scholarship in order to train and compete in the 2002
Winter Olympics.' In 2002, before arriving at CU, Jeremy
became the World Cup champion in freestyle moguls skiing
and the youngest person ever to be ranked number one in
freestyle moguls? Before enrolling at CU, Bloom acquired
endorsement contracts with Dynastar, Oakley, and Under
Armour, for which he was paid to use the manufacturers'
equipment, goggles, and apparel.3 The endorsements enable
Bloom to earn a comfortable living and to support the costs
associated with a professional skiing career. I
As a freshman at CU,Jeremy Bloom, a wide receiver
and punt-return specialist, had a 94-yard reception which was
the longest in school history and an 80-yard punt return
against Oklahoma in the 2002 Big 12 championship game.5
Bloom studies Communications and hopes to pursue a career
as a television and movie performer.6 He also has a modeling
contract with clothing designerTommy Hilfiger and acquired
on-camera acting positions with Nickelodeon and Music
Television (MTV), which provide valuable opportunities to
realize his career goals.7
The only thing standing between Jeremy Bloom and
a multifaceted success story are the National Collegiate
Athletic Association's [hereinafter "NCAA"] amateurism
rules. NCAA rules provide that a student forfeits eligibility
by violating any regulations related to amateurism in Article
12 of the NCAA Division I Manual.8 The NCAA's Athletics
Reputation Rule prohibits forms of compensation to student-
athletes resulting from: "publicity, reputation, fame, or
personal following that he or she has obtained because of
athletics ability. 9 In Bloom's case, the NCAA demonstrated
its unwillingness to distinguish between the legitimate income
of a professional athlete and the amateur status of a student-
athlete. The NCAA's interpretation of "athletics ability" as it
relates to pre-enrollment promotional activities and
compensation in general, reveals the NCAA's inability to
respond to a unique situation.
In essence,the NCAA has determined that, in order
to remain eligible for football at CU, Bloom must forfeit the
endorsements and modeling contracts he acquired as a
professional skier, and, in doing so, jeopardize a potentially
illustrious professional skiing and acting career. Bloom's case
highlights the injustice and hypocrisy of the NCAA's
amateurism rules and enforcement mechanisms. While the
NCAA increasingly allows the exploitation of student-
athletes, it haphazardly asserts amateurism rules to preclude
legitimate professional opportunities for student-athletes.
This Note argues that the NCAA's interpretation of
the amateurism provisions of the NCAA Division I Manual,
with respect to Jeremy Bloom, is unreasonable, particularly in
light of the NCAA's treatment of other dual-sport
professional athletes. Consequently, the NCAA should create
an exception to its amateurism provisions allowing Bloom and
similarly-situated student-athletes to earn income from
sources unrelated to the amateur sport in which they
compete. Furthermore, since the NCAA Bylaws constitute
a contract to which student-athletes are third-party
beneficiaries, courts should provide a forum to ensure the
consistent and equitable application of the provisions of that
contract. Part I explains the NCAA's role in regulating
student-athletes and the regulations that are applicable to
Jeremy Bloom's case. A discussion about the NCAA's inability
in this case to forge a solution that is consistent with its
principles and rules will also be covered in this part. Part II
describes the legal battle between Jeremy Bloom and the
NCAA as an example of the court's historical deference to
the NCAA in enforcing its amateurism rules. This part also
considers the merits of an antitrust claim under these
circumstances and provides an analysis of Bloom's contract
claim against the NCAA. Part III assesses the NCAA's
application of its rules to Bloom and suggests how the NCAA
and the courts should approach future cases involving
similarly-situated student-athletes. Part IV concludes that the
NCAA's reluctance to provide a waiver to Jeremy Bloom is
inconsistent with both its rules and its policies. Whether or
not a court provides a remedy, the NCAA should revisit its
position to better manage future cases.
1Bakroud The NC ~AAAma
The aiona Cod egiateAthtic
Association and Applicabk
Regulitions
The NCAA is an unincorporated voluntary
association with approximately 1,200 members, consisting of
colleges, universities, and other educational institutions, with
more than 360,000 student-athletes. 0 The members have
adopted a constitution and bylaws specifying the agreements
among members and rules under which they agree to
operate.' The NCAA, initially created in 1906, regulates
intercollegiate athletics to promote amateurism, academic
integrity, and fair competition. 2 At its founding,the NCAA's
stated purpose was as follows:
Its object shall be the regulation and supervision of
college athletics throughout the United States, in order
that the athletic activities ... may be maintained on an
ethical plane in keeping with the dignity and high
purpose of education."
Originally, NCAA member institutions agreed to self-policing,
a concept known as "home rule"."4 It was not until 1940 that
the membership authorized the NCAA Executive Committee
to investigate alleged violations of the NCAA's amateurism
regulations and to issue interpretations of the NCAA's
constitution. 's
Today, the NCAA is a commercial enterprise that
looks to maximize profits beyond a competitive rate. 6
Several scholars have argued that the NCAA maximizes
profits by upholding an outdated principle of amateurism,
which prevents student-athletes from profiting from their
athletic abilities. 7 NCAA regulations governing the conduct
of intercollegiate athletic programs must be adopted by the
membership. 8 Member institutions are obligated to apply
and enforce NCAA legislation, and the enforcement
procedures of the NCAA are applied to an institution when
it fails to fulfill this obligation. 9 Furthermore, courts have
recognized the NCAA as serving these important functions."
The NCAA posits as the philosophy underlying its
regulations in The Principle of Amateurism, which reads as
follows:
"Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an
intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be
motivated primarily by education and by the physical,
mental and social benefits to be derived. Student
participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation
and student-athletes should be protected from
exploitation by professional and commercial
enterprises.
'2'
The NCAA has several regulations that purport to
further this philosophy in intercollegiate athletics. First,
NCAA Bylaw 14.01.3.1 provides that a student-athlete
forfeits eligibility for participation in an intercollegiate sport
by accepting payment in any form for participation in that
sport or by violating any other regulations related to
amateurism inArticle 12.22 This eligibility rule is reiterated in
Bylaw 12. 1. 1 (a) which provides that an individual loses
amateur status and shall not be eligible for intercollegiate
competition if the individual "uses his or her athletic skill
(directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport.
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Bylaw 12. I. 1(a) is narrowly constructed such that an individual
must receive payment for participation in the sport in which
he competes as a student-athlete in order to forfeit eligibility.
Therefore, Bloom cannot violate Bylaw 12. I. 1 (a) by earning
income as a professional skier because he would not be
earning income from the intercollegiate sport in which he
competes: football.
In fact, as early as 1974, a professional athlete in one
sport has been permitted to represent a member institution
in a different sport. 24 A student-athlete is permitted to earn
a salary as a professional with the caveat that a student-athlete
may not receive institutional financial assistance so long as he
is receiving remuneration from a professional sports
organization.2' This regulation permits two-sport athletes to
collect salaries as professionals in a different sport without
forfeiting their amateur status. Most notably, this provision
enabled Drew Henson to cash in on a $2 million signing bonus
to play for the NewYorkYankees while playing football at the
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University of Michigan and Chris Weinke to accept a $400,000
signing bonus with the Toronto Blue Jays before winning the
Heisman trophy as the quarterback at Florida State
University.
26
Although Bloom hoped to earn an income as a skier
in accordance with NCAA regulations, he would lose his
amateur status due to his planned endorsement income. The
NCAA amateurism regulations limit the type and amount of
compensation available to student-athletes. Compensation
may be paid to a student-athlete only for work actually
performed and at the going rate in that locality for similar
services. 7 Moreover, Bylaw 12.4. I. [,the Athletics Reputation
Rule, provides that compensation may not include any
remuneration for value or utility that a student-athlete may
have for an employer because of the publicity, reputation, fame
or personal following that a student-athlete has obtained from
athletics ability.28 Unlike the NCAA's Principle of Amateurism
and eligibility rules, the amateurism rules are not narrowly
drawn by the qualifying language of"in that sport". In turn, the
rules regarding amateurism grant the NCAA broader
discretion to limit compensation to student-athletes that is
not directly linked to their status as a student-athlete. The
NCAA expressly prohibits compensation for post-enrollment
promotional activities, including advertisements, modeling, and
endorsements. 29 Furthermore, although Article 12 grants an
exception for pre-enrollment promotional activities, the
requirements, which incorporate the "athletics ability"
language of the Athletics Reputation rule and omit the
qualifying"in an intercollegiate sport" language, are so limiting
as to render the exception meaningless.30
In addition to the self-enforcement mechanism
imposed on NCAA member institutions, the enforcement
procedures of the NCAA include the Restitution Rule of
Bylaw 19.8."' The Restitution Rule provides a list of sanctions
that the NCAA may impose against a member institution
whose student-athlete participates in competition under the
terms of an injunction, which is later vacated, stayed, or
reversed. 2 In light of the duration of litigating disputes with
the NCAA and the brevity of a collegiate career, a student-
athlete's only effective legal remedy is an injunction against the
NCAA and/or a member institution, allowing a student-
athlete to take a desired course of action while the dispute
is being resolved. On the other hand, the potential for such
severe sanctions under Bylaw 19.8 discourages institutions
from adhering to injunctions against the NCAA, and, as
Bloom's case has revealed, may discourage courts from issuing
injunctions against an institution at all.
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Finally, under Bylaw 14.02.12, the NCAA may provide
a waiver exempting an individual from the application of a
specific regulation.3 4 A waiver requires formal approval by the
NCAA's Management Council, an NCAA committee or an
NCAA conference. Such a waiver enables the NCAA to
apply its regulations on a case-by-case basis. The waiver
provides the NCAA with a mechanism to enforce its
regulations equitably and in a manner that is consistent with




Beginning in 1997, an NCAA Subcommittee on
Agents and Amateurism began to identify problems with the
organization's emphasis on amateurism in order to develop
deregulation proposals that embodied a common sense
approach to amateurism." The subcommittee was interested
in taking a realistic approach to
pre-enrollment activities and
focusing on what it called the
true concern of amateurism,
competitive inequity.36 The
subcommittee recognized that
certain NCAA eligibility rules
were penalizing prospective
student-athletes for actions
that gave them no competitive
advantage in intercollegiate
sports. 7
The NCAA deregulation proposals derived from
frequent questions voiced by scholars, administrators, and
student-athletes. Those questions included the following:
"Are there differences between Olympians who accept
their prize money and those who do not? Will people
increasingly take advantages of opportunities outside
the college arena? Should NCAA amateurism rules
extend to individuals who are not part of the NCAA?
If the NCAA decides not to make changes should it
take a different approach to enforcing NCAA rules."38
The NCAA subcommittee's proposals and the
reforms that developed out of those proposals involved a
major response to the realities of amateur competition. The
pre-enrollment proposals included waivers to the ineligibility
rules for certain pre-enrollment amateur and professional
competition. 9 The proposals allowed individuals to enter
professional drafts and sign professional contracts without
forfeiting eligibility.40 In essence, the reforms sought to
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maximize the opportunities of the student-athlete to succeed
particularly where no competitive advantage is at stake.
Finally, although these proposals addressed shortcomings
related to eligibility rules, the Bloom case brought to light
similar shortcomings in the amateurism rules.
C. The NCAA's Stance on Bloom:
An Inconsistent Application of its
Regulations
In the early part of 2002 the NCAA denied Jeremy
Bloom's request for a waiver under Bylaw 14.02.12, which
allows the NCAA to formally approve an exception for an
individual from the application of a specific regulation.4
Bloom's inability to acquire a waiver of the Athletics
Reputation Rule prohibited him from accepting
endorsements without forfeiting his eligibility to play football
at the University of Colorado.42 Bloom's waiver application
noted that mogul skiing is not a collegiate sport, that it is a
different sport than that he planned to participate in at the
University of Colorado, and that endorsements and
sponsorships are the standard form of compensation for a
professional skier."
Professional skiers earn a living and pay the cost of
training for and participating in events through
endorsements. 44 Before entering the college ranks Bloom
received several endorsements which allowed him to
compete on the World Cup circuit. It will cost him $15,000
to $20,000 to compete in up to seven moguls events during
the 2003 professional skiing season. 4 The NCAA's
amateurism rules, however, effectively prohibit compensation
in the form of endorsements.4 6 Without endorsement money,
Bloom is unable to hire a coach and personal trainer like other
competitors.47
In light of the NCAA's recent reform efforts, the
policy goals underlying the reforms and existing regulations,
and its treatment of other two-sport professional athletes,the
NCAA's denial of a waiver to Jeremy Bloom is difficult to
explain. Bloom's case requires the NCAA to revisit the same
questions that provoked it to pass amateurism deregulation
legislation. Do Jeremy Bloom's endorsements, which are
related to his professional skiing activity, render him unfit to
play college football? Will the NCAA's stance discourage
Bloom and similarly-situated athletes from going to college?
Should the amateurism rules extend to a student-athlete's
activities that are unrelated to the NCAA? In short,
notwithstanding the fact that NCAA reforms support
Bloom's position, the NCAA contradicted itself and those
reforms by denying Bloom a waiver.
The NCAA amateurism rules pose the greatest
impediment to Bloom's skiing career because they essentially
prohibit student-athletes from receiving endorsements. The
amateurism rules fundamentally conflict with Bylaw 12.1.2,
which authorizes professional athletes to compete as student-
athletes in a different sport. The absolute ban on
endorsements ignores the economic realities that face dual-
sport athletes, such as professional skiers, who are
compensated in the form of endorsements rather than
salaries. Due to their heavy reliance on endorsements to
maintain a competitive advantage, professional skiers are
effectively precluded from becoming dual-sport student!
professional-athletes. Finally, the amateurism rules are far
more invasive than the eligibility rules. The amateurism rules
prohibit compensation due to "athletics ability" in general,
instead of activities related to a student-athlete's participation
in a particular sport.
The NCAA must reconcile its denial of a waiver to
Jeremy Bloom with its underlying goal of preventing
competitive inequity in collegiate sports. First,through its past
practice and existing regulations, the NCAA has established
a precedent for allowing student-athletes to be compensated
as professionals in sports outside of intercollegiate sports.48
Secondly, the NCAA should not be allowed to discriminate
against certain student-athletes who wish to maximize value
as a student-athlete and a professional athlete in a different
sport. Jeremy Bloom does not pose any greater threat to
competitive inequity than the professional athlete who
receives a salary. Consequently, where regulations such as the
Athletics Reputation rule do not comport with other NCAA
regulations and the principles espoused by the organization,
the NCAA must develop a case-by-case approach to enforce
its regulations consistently; otherwise, courts should enjoin
the enforcement of those regulations.
A. The Naetional CollegiateAthletic
Association and Applicable
Regulations
Courts have historically given the NCAA a high level
of deference with respect to the enforcement of its eligibility
and compensation regulations as a means of maintaining
amateurism.49 Challenges to NCAA regulations have typically
come in the form of claims of restraint of trade and
competition under the Sherman AntitrustAct.i° In NCAA v.
Board of Regents, the Supreme Court found that antitrust laws
regulate the NCAA, and struck down a football marketing
plan as an illegal anti-competitive agreement.5 The Board of
Regents court found anti-competitive restrictions reasonable
only if those restrictions further education and amateurism
in intercollegiate college athletics.5 2 Several scholars have
noted that the court's reasoning provided an opportunity to
challenge the NCAA compensation restrictions.s3 The court
also stated that the NCAA needs ample latitude to preserve
education and amateurism in college athletics.5 4 The court
indicated that only the business activities of the NCAA are
subject to antitrust scrutiny.55 In dicta, the court said that,"it
is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls
of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition
among amateur athletic teams and, therefore, pro-competitive
because they enhance the public interest in intercollegiate
athletics.51 6 Furthermore, the Board of Regents court stated,
The NCAA seems to market a particular brand of
football-college football. The identification of this
product with an academic tradition differentiates
college football from and makes it more popular than
professional sports to which it might otherwise be
comparable, such as,for example, minor league baseball.
In order to preserve the character and quality of the
"product," athletes must not be paid, must be required
to attend class, and the like. 7
Subsequent courts over the last several decades have rejected
antitrust challenges to NCAA policies based on the court's
reasoning in Board of Regents. 8
Only one court has addressed the issue of whether
the NCAA's limited compensation regulations violate
antitrust laws. 9 In McCormack, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, citing dicta from Board of Regents,
rejected a claim that the NCAA's compensation restrictions
constituted price fixing by the NCAA. 6' Although the
plaintiffs argued that the NCAA permits some compensation
through scholarships and allows student-athletes to compete
as professionals in a different sport, the McCormack court
found that the NCAA has the power to maintain a system
containing some amateur requirements.6 The McCormack
court has been highly criticized for relying on the language
from Board of Regents instead of applying its own antitrust
analysis.
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Deference to the NCAA's amateurism policy has
become the norm for courts hearing challenges of NCAA
regulations. 63 Although the philosophy of amateurism has
continuously been used by courts to strike down antitrust
challenges against the NCAA, collegiate sports involve an
increased level of commercialism which undermines the
validity of rulings based solely on amateurism.6M Furthermore,
such deference is unjustified in light of the fact that student-
athletes, such as Bloom, may present meritorious challenges
to NCAA regulations. Most importantly, the Supreme Court
has not spoken on an antitrust challenge to NCAA
compensation restrictions, and a successful challenge remains
to be mounted.
B. Jeremy Bloom v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association
Bloom responded to the NCAA's waiver denial by
instituting a claim in Boulder County, Colorado District Court
seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the NCAA from declaring him
ineligible.6 Boulder County District CourtJudge Daniel Hale
denied Bloom's request for injunctive relief on the grounds
that he could not satisfy three of the six factors required for
an injunction.66 Citing Rathke v. MacFarlane,67 the district court
held that Bloom had demonstrated three of the six factors,
including the following: the danger of real immediate and
irreparable injury; that there was no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy at law; and that the issuance of an injunction
would preserve the status quo pending a trial on the merits.68
Judge Hale expressed the opinion that Bloom is truly an
amateur athlete in football, and that by failing to provide a
waiver, the NCAA was missing an opportunity to support
amateurism as well as the non-athletic growth of a student-
athlete. 69 However, Bloom failed to demonstrate the
following other three factors: a reasonable probability of
success on the merits; that the balance of equities favored
issuance; and that issuance of the injunction would serve the
public interest.
70
Bloom's attorneys, citing Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin,7
argued a reasonable probability of success on the merits of
a breach-of-contract claim on several grounds. First, that the
NCAA breached its contract to provide student-athletes with
the same educational opportunities available to other
students and to permit Bloom to be a professional athlete in
one sport while remaining an amateur in a second sport. 72
Second, Bloom argued that because none of the opportunities
he seeks to continue involve football, the NCAA's regulation
is arbitrary and capricious. 73 Third, Bloom argued that NCAA
Bylaws contravene public policy because they prevent him
from pursuing pre-existing employment opportunities. 74




The NCAA conceded that its constitution and
bylaws constitute a contract between it and its member
institutions. 76 Furthermore, the district court determined
that student-athletes, including Jeremy Bloom, are third-party
beneficiaries in the contract between the NCAA and member
institutions because the NCAA and its member institutions
intended to benefit the person not a party to the contract,
and that benefit is direct and not merely incidental.77 The
district court found no breach because the NCAA was
enforcing its bylaws as written and/or as it interprets the
bylaws in order to foster amateurism. 71 Judge Hale refused
to substitute his judgment for that of the NCAA. 7' The
district court determined that Bloom should not be able to
earn income in a form other than a salary under Bylaw 12.1.2,
which permits student-athletes to earn a salary in a
professional sport other than their collegiate sport, on the
grounds that professional athletes receiving a salary might also
try to retain endorsements.80  Next, the district court
determined there is a rational basis for restricting
promotional appearances in Bylaw 12.5.1.3 because Bloom's
fame as both a professional skier and a college football player
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might be involved in the endorsement deals.' Finally, the than a facial challenge, such as a claim made on antitrust
court determined that the administrative process was not grounds. Bloom most likely adopted a contractual argument
arbitrary and capricious.8 2  to minimize the effect of judicial deference to the NCAA,
Bloom argued which has proven
that an issuance of an insurmountable to
injunction would serve parties raising
the public interest antitrust claims in the
because it would allow past. Nevertheless,
Bloom to represent the Bloom was unable to
United States of establish a reasonable
America in the likelihood of success
Olympics, void or a favorable balance
restrictions on of the equities due to
employment, maximize the same type of
entertainment value for deference to the
the public, enable NCAA. Although
Bloom to pay his way Bloom elected not to
through college and prevent a breach of his contract with raise an antitrust claim, a similarly-situated student-athlete
Tommy Hilfiger. 83 Judge Hale determined Bloom had not may present a viable challenge to NCAA amateurism rules as
demonstrated that the issuance of an injunction would serve an unreasonable restraint of trade under the Sherman
the public interest because the NCAA's ability to regulate Antitrust Act. 9'
student-athletes would be impaired and CU could potentially ( ) a Rtnc: On the Pnat
face sanctions under the Restitution Rule of Bylaw 19.8.4
Finally, Judge Hale determined that Bloom had not satisfied
the balance of the equities factor based on his findings with The district court's denial of an injunction was due in
respect to the public interest factor. 85 large part to the Restitution Rule and the potential sanctions
Judge Hale's opinion is an example of the court's that CU could face were an injunction to be overturned.92
historical deference to the NCAA. The decision resembles Imposing sanctions on an institution which complies with a
McCormack insofar as it upholds an NCAA regulation without court order violates public policy; accordingly, Bylaw 19.8,the
legitimately considering the merits of the legal challenge.86  Restitution Rule, should be struck down. Bylaw 19.8 is a risk
Moreover, the decision evidences deference to the NCAA allocation device which allows a member institution to weigh
above pure legal analysis that has also characterized previous the benefits of allowing a student-athlete to compete under
decisions on challenges to NCAA compensation restrictions an injunction with the risks of potential sanctions that may be
under the Sherman AntitrustAct. Rather than analyzing the imposed if an injunction is overturned. Typically, unless a court
rights of the parties under the contractual provisions of the orders a member institution to allow a student-athlete to
NCAA Bylaws, Judge Hale found a rational basis for the compete, an institution makes the final determination of
NCAA's enforcement of the provisions as written or as whether a student-athlete may compete. The Lasege court
interpreted by the NCAA.8 7 Rather than perform his role, recognized that Bylaw 19.8 embodies an agreement between
Judge Hale elected,"not to substitute [his] judgment for that the member institutions as to how competitive equity should
of the NCAA and its members."88 The case is currently be restored in the event of an erroneous court determination
pending in the Colorado State Court of Appeals, and it regarding a student-athlete's eligibility. 11 In turn, the
remains to be seen whether the court will legitimately Restitution Rule is intended to contribute to a balance of the
consider the merits of Bloom's legal arguments.89 equities and serves the public interest by acknowledging a
C. The Merits of the Case: Bloom s
Contract Claim and an Alternative
Claim uder the Sherman Antitrust
Act
Bloom argues that the NCAA's application of its
bylaws constitutes a breach-of-contract, and that the NCAA's
enforcement should be refuted as arbitrary and capricious.90
Bloom's claim embodies a narrow challenge to NCAA rules
as they have been applied to him. The claim is quite different
student-athlete's right to a judicial remedy and allowing
member institutions to make a cost-benefit analysis.
Prior to handing down his ruling on Bloom's request
for an injunction, Judge Hale ordered CU to take sides
because of "internally conflicting interests."94 Therefore, CU
entered an appearance and aligned itself with the NCAA as
an involuntary defendant." As a result, the district court
denied an injunction on the grounds that notwithstanding the
probability of success on the merits, the possibility that an
injunction would be overturned and the institution would face
sanctions was sufficient to find that the public interest and
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balance of the equities did not
favor Bloom. Where a member
institution is joined as a
defendant and compelled to
adhere to an injunction, the
Restitution Rule exposes
member institutions to the risk
of sanctions for complying with
a court order. Such a rule
violates public policy because it
punishes a party that complies
with a court order. Furthermore, where a court denies a
student-athlete an injunction due to the harsh consequences
of the Restitution Rule it denies the right to a judicial remedy
in violation of public policy. Accordingly, courts should enjoin
the NCAA from imposing sanctions under such
circumstances.
(2) Bloou."s Bre-ach-ofContract Claim
Bloom claims that he has a contractual right to earn
income as a professional skier.96 This right derives from the
combination of three provisions. The Principle of Amateurism
provides that, "[s]tudent athletes shall be amateurs in an
intercollegiate sport.' ' 97 Bylaw 12.1.2 provides that,"[a]
professional athlete in one sport may represent a member
institution in a different sport."98 Finally, Bloom claims that he
has the right in his professional sport to use his "athletics skill
(directly or indirectly) for pay in any form."99 Bloom simply
wants to maintain his amateur status as a collegiate football
player while resuming his unrelated career as a professional
skier.
Bloom also argues that the NCAA acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in denying a waiver under Bylaw 14.02.12.'0
First, Bloom notes that the NCAA is not entitled to the
deference normally afforded voluntary associations in dealing
with its members because student-athletes are not
members. 01 Furthermore, in light of the substance of the
rules and the procedures by which they are applied, the
NCAA acted arbitrarily. 02 The NCAA has the ability to
handle his unique circumstances on a case-by-case approach.
Denying a waiver requires the NCAA to ignore NCAA rules
regarding professional athletes who receive salaries and
current economic realities of professional skiers.
Furthermore, under Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, °3 Bloom
could have argued that the NCAA breached an implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing in failing to provide a waiver.'
°4
"The duty of good faith and fair dealing applies when one
party has discretionary authority to determine certain terms
of a contract."'0 This duty exists in every contract to enforce
the reasonable expectations of the parties.0 6 Additionally,
"whether a party acted in good faith is a question of fact which
must be determined on a case-by-case basis.'
0 7
Bloom's argument that the NCAA breached an
implied covenant of good faith is premised on the fact that the
NCAA has discretionary authority over the enforcement of
its regulations. The particular discretion in Bloom's case is the
NCAA's ability to provide him with a waiver to retain
endorsements as compensation in a different, professional
sport.108 To establish that the NCAA did not show good faith,
Bloom must demonstrate he had a reasonable expectation
that the NCAA would provide him with a waiver.0 9
Bloom has a compelling argument that the NCAA
has denied him his reasonable expectations. Bloom can point
to existing NCAA regulations, which allow student-athletes
to receive compensation as professionals in a different
sport."'0 Bloom may draw on examples of student-athletes
whom the NCAA has allowed to compete as professionals
in different sports under that rule, including Drew Henson
and Chris Weinke."' If the NCAA insists that compensation
to professional skiers through endorsements is significantly
different than compensation to other professional athletes in
the form of a salary, it should be refuted as a distinction that
lacks substance and creates an inequitable result. By pointing
to this flawed distinction, Bloom can undermine an attempt
by the NCAA to justify its denial of a waiver for the sake of
amateurism or competitive equity.
The NCAA would have to argue that endorsements
are inherently contrary to amateurism and that allowing
student-athletes, such as Bloom, to accept endorsements
creates competitive inequity in intercollegiate sports. Bloom
could first rebut that argument by presenting evidence that
intercollegiate athletics is a business enterprise where
commercial endorsements are commonplace. As several
scholars have noted, the traditional amateur/education model
of collegiate sports has given way to the commercial
education model that currently exists.' 2 Furthermore,
Bloom and his attorneys have repeatedly pointed to the
hypocrisy of the NCAA for allowing coaches and institutions
to profit from endorsements from shoe and apparel
companies." 3




Although Bloom's attorneys may have elected not to
mount an antitrust attack on NCAA amateurism rules due to
SPORTS
the court's historical deference to the NCAA regarding such
claims, one must at least consider such an argument. Bloom's
case would not embody a traditional challenge to NCAA
regulations under the Sherman Antitrust Act. 114 Such
challenges have typically alleged that the NCAA is involved in
price fixing or restraining competition amongst member
institutions.'" Bloom's challenge would involve the argument
that the NCAA is unreasonably restraining trade by
prohibiting student-athletes, such as him, from receiving
standard compensation as professional skiers. Although such
a challenge is novel,framing the challenge in such a way, in light
of recent NCAA reforms, might also provide a viable antitrust
argument and undermine the NCAA's justification for the
enforcement of amateurism rules.
()AppI-ability of the Sherman
Antitrust Act
The basic requirement for application of the Sherman
Act is that the activity in question involves or affects interstate
commerce."16 Courts formerly provided a blanket exemption
from antitrust scrutiny to nonprofit regulatory groups such
as the NCAA." 17 In recent years, however, courts have held
that the NCAA is involved in commerce and its regulations,
including those restricting compensation, involve or affect
interstate commerce.'" In light of the Supreme Court's
decision in UnitedStates v. Lopez,' " the NCAA could raise the
argument that it is not involved in commerce and, therefore,
its rules should not be subject to scrutiny under the Sherman
Act. 
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In Smith v. NCAA,' 21 the court held that the Sherman
Antitrust Act is only applicable to NCAA activities that are
related to its commerce or business. 22 Critics of Smith v.
NCAA note several reasons why removing certain NCAA
activities from antitrust scrutiny is inappropriate. 23 First,
antitrust laws are only applicable to activities defined as
commerce. 2 4 Second, the Supreme Court in Board of Regents
v. NCAA accepted the fact that NCAA regulations involve
commerce. 2 Finally, doing so fails to acknowledge pervasive
commercialism in collegiate sports. 26 Each of these facts
discourages a court from providing the NCAA with a blanket
exemption from antitrust scrutiny. The commercial
enterprise pervading the NCAA and its member institutions
makes it disingenuous to say the NCAA is not involved in
commerce. Even if a court were to follow Smiththe argument
is undermined by the fact that the regulated activity (i.e.,
restrictions that limit the ability of certain two-sport athletes
from competing as professionals) is related to commerce.
Although there is some dispute among lower courts
as to whether a plaintiff must establish a nexus between the
challenged restraint and interstate commerce or simply an
effect on commerce resulting from the defendant's business
activities in general, both tests could be satisfied under the
facts in Bloom's case.' 27 The NCAA compensation
restrictions, analyzed in the context of non-salaried athletes
participating in different professional sports, satisfy both tests
for involving or affecting interstate commerce. Just like
intercollegiate athletics, professional sports competition, and
skiing in particular, involves athletes from various states and
countries. The economic interests at stake for student-
athletes who are also professionals are corporate
endorsements and sponsorship opportunities that are
inextricably linked to interstate commerce.
The NCAA would likely argue that it does not
prohibit student-athletes from competing in professional
sports, only that it prohibits compensation in the form of
endorsements and corporate sponsorships. 2 ' It would
probably point to NCAA Bylaw 12.1.2 that expressly allows
student-athletes to be compensated as professionals in a
different sport.2 9 However, the argument fails to
acknowledge that endorsements and sponsorships are
essential to participation in individual sports such as skiing.
30
Whereas salaried athletes' compensation includes the costs
of training, travel, equipment, and the like, individual athletes
such as Bloom rely on endorsements to cover such
expenses.' Thus, current NCAA regulations that deem
endorsements an improper form of compensation prevent
student-athletes, such as Bloom, from competing as
professionals and, therefore, adversely affect interstate
commerce.
(2) The Viability of the Claim under the
Rule-of-Season Standard
A lawsuit challenging the NCAA compensation
policies will be scrutinized under the rule-of-reason
standard.'32 Once it is demonstrated that the activity in
question has a substantially adverse effect on commerce,the
rule-of-reason test requires that the defendant demonstrate
the pro-competitive virtue of the challenged behavior.'33
Finally, the rule-of-reason test requires that the plaintiff show
that the challenged conduct is either not necessary to achieve
the pro-competitive justifications put forth by the defendant
or that those justifications can be achieved in a less restrictive
manner.
34
By pointing to the endorsements and modeling
contracts that the NCAA required him to forfeit in order to
maintain his eligibility as a student-athlete, Bloom could
demonstrate that the Athletics Reputation Rule has a
substantially adverse affect on commerce. He can point to the
fact that he and similarly-situated athletes are essentially
precluded from earning a living as professional athletes
without the ability to be compensated through endorsements.
The NCAA will probably not argue its regulations do not have
an adverse effect on commerce, but instead will rely on its
argument about the pro-competitive nature of the regulations
as a defense.
The NCAA has traditionally resorted to the
justification that the compensation restrictions are necessary
to protect amateurism and to protect college athletics.'35 The
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NCAA has argued that payment of athletes blurs the
distinction between college and professional sports, which
would result in the loss of the uniqueness of their product.
36
The success of Bloom's claim may not lie in his ability to
demonstrate that amateurism is no longer the primary
concern of intercollegiate sports, but rather in his ability to
demonstrate that the amateurism ideal is not implicated by
his claim for an exception to the Athletics Reputation Rule.
Bloom's unique challenge to NCAA compensation
regulations, as an illegal restraint of competition as a
professional in a different sport, combined with the NCAA's
policy of permitting compensation for student-athletes
participating as professionals in different sports, would further
undermine such a justification. Although the NCAA might
argue that endorsements and sponsorships are distinguishable
from salaries and pose a threat to the competitive nature of
collegiate athletics, it is an argument which truly lacks merit
when applied to sports such as skiing.'
37
In the end, it seems as though the merits of Jeremy
Bloom's claim are substantial either in the form of a claim for
breach of contract or as an illegal restraint of trade and
competition. The success of such a claim depends on whether
an argument can be formulated to undermine the court's
historical deference to NCAA amateurism policies. The force
behind each of these distinct causes of action relies on NCAA
regulations that clearly contradict any pro-competitive
justifications the NCAA might proffer for restricting
compensation in the form of endorsements and sponsorships
to individual athletes such as Jeremy Bloom. Unfortunately,
as history has revealed, the ability to succeed on a claim
against the NCAA in the courtroom will be impeded by the
amount of weight the court gives to the NCAA's argument
that it is attempting to maintain amateurism. NCAA reform
has typically been internally-generated. In turn, the courts may
not be the forum for effectuating change. Bloom and similarly-
situated athletes may be forced to rely on state legislatures,
the member institutions, and public pressure to convince the
NCAA to reconcile their current rules and policies with their
decision in this case.
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Criticism of NCAA restrictison compensation for
student-athletes has reached a breaking point and if the
NCAA does not implement further reform, changes may
emerge through different avenues. In 2000, Ramogi Huma, a
former UCLA linebacker, and fourteen of his former
teammates formed the Collegiate Athletes Coalition (CAC)
in an attempt to bring America's age old labor struggle to
college sports. 38 Among the demands made by the CAC are
increasing monthly stipends for players, eliminating the $2000
cap on wages the student-athlete may earn, and giving players
health insurance for off season workouts 39 The CAC has




resounds in the case of Jeremy
Bloom, and increased
exposure of cases such as his is
likely to foster support for the
activist group.
Early in 2003,the Nebraska
legislature considered a bill
that would authorize the
payment of a minimum wage
stipend in addition to
scholarship funds to Nebraska
football players. 4 ' Despite the
fact that any player who would receive payment under such
a law would become ineligible to compete under NCAA rules,
Nebraska legislators are trying to gather support amongst
their Big 12 Conference counterparts. 42 By passing similar
legislation in each of the states that compose the conference,
the advocates of deregulating student-athlete compensation
hope to generate a strong voice which compels the NCAA
to listen, and quite possibly, separate from the NCAA.143
In the summer of 2003, California State Senator Kevin
Murray introduced legislation to enhance student-athletes'
rights and financial benefits.' The NCAA stated that if the
legislation passes, California athletes might be declared
ineligible to compete in NCAA events.'45 Murray sees it as
an opportunity to convince the NCAA to address the
concerns of student-athletes.146 Bloom has become a political
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advocate by contributing to the drafting of a "Student-
Athlete's Bill of Rights" which proposes ways to enhance
scholarships, including an allowance to secure employment
not related to an amateur sport. "47
The reform sought by the aforementioned groups
challenges the NCAA's theory of limiting direct
compensation to student-
athletes. Several scholars have
argued for a slightly less radical
reform, suggesting that the
NCAA should deregulate
student-athletes' indirect 7.
financial activities. 48 This '
author simply argues that the
NCAA should treat all
student-athletes equally under
its existing regulations in order
to maximize student welfare.
In doing so, the NCAA must
allow certain dual-sport
professional/student-athletes
to receive compensation in the form of endorsements and
corporate sponsorships. The NCAA must construe the
Athletics Reputation Rule narrowly so as only to prohibit
compensation that a student-athlete obtains because of
"athletics ability" in the collegiate sport he or she actively
participates. Such a construction is reasonable because it
would not foster competitive inequity in any way. In other
words, allowing Bloom to earn a living as a skier will provide
CU with no advantage relative to its competitors. Each school
would be able to recruit dual-sport athletes and each student-
athlete could benefit from opportunities that are unrelated
to their status as a collegiate athlete.
The NCAA could accomplish this goal either by
providing a waiver or crafting a narrow exception to its
amateurism rules. Such an allowance for dual-sport athletes
does not generate competitive inequity. The NCAA does not
have a legitimate concern that certain institutions will attract
premier athletes on the basis of the ability of their student-
athletes to acquire lucrative endorsement deals. Such a
waiver would apply on a case-by-case basis and given the
unique circumstances of Bloom, would be relatively
uncommon. Professional athletes receiving direct monetary
compensation would not be permitted to retain
endorsements as alternative forms of compensation.
Moreover, a student-athlete's ability to obtain endorsements
would be completely unrelated to his or her relationship with
an institution.
The only impact such an exception might have on
competitive equity would be with respect to the level of
accommodation different member institutions provide to a
dual-sport student-athletes. Moreover, it would not be anti-
competitive in the sense that it disrupts an otherwise level
playing field because each member institution would have the
ability to accommodate such athletes. Furthermore, the
NCAA has implicitly condoned this type of competition
under Bylaw 12.1.2. The NCAA may argue that allowing some
student-athletes to accept endorsements while denying
endorsements to others deviates from an otherwise bright-
line rule. The NCAA could easily draw a bright line for the
exception by permitting student-athletes to retain and renew
existing endorsements while prohibiting an individual from
obtaining new endorsements during his tenure as a student-
athlete.
Bylaw 12.4. 1.1 should be revised so as to resemble
the language in Bylaw 12. I. I which relates to eligibility
limitations on pre-enrollment compensation. 49 Bylaw 12. 1.1
provides that an individual loses amateur status and eligibility
if he or she uses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly)
for pay in any form in that sport."" The pre-enrollment
compensation restriction is narrowly tailored so as to limit
its application to participation in just the relevant sport. The
NCAA and student-athletes would be better served by such
an amendment to the amateurism rules.
Furthermore, the NCAA should revise Bylaw 12.1.2
"Amateur Status if Professional in Another Sport" so as to
clarify the compensation allowance that accompanies it. The
supplementary regulation should provide that compensation
may be in the form of"salaries, prize money, and as otherwise
provided under 14.02.12 on a case-by-case basis after formal
approval by the NCAA Management Council or a NCAA
committee or a NCAA conference." Such a mechanism
responds directly to the concerns expressed by Judge Hale
that professional athletes receiving direct monetary
compensation might attempt to retain endorsements as well.
By not expressly allowing compensation in the form of
endorsements the NCAA can retain control on the
prevalence of corporate interests in the collegiate realm. Such
a waiver provision would give the NCAA the ability to
provide for unique situations such as that presented by Jeremy
Bloom.
This approach would be consistent with the policies
espoused in the NCAA's recent amateurism deregulation
Making a Mountain Out of a Mogul
effort and would assuage the common criticism of the NCAA.
Bloom has not allowed restrictive NCAA amateurism rules
to dissuade him from going to college, but he is part of a
minority of individuals who elect to go to college when faced
with that choice.' This approach would also advance the
welfare of student athletes to permit them to reap the
benefits of personal and athletic accomplishments that are
achieved before participating in collegiate athletics.
B The Appropriate Course of
Action for Cours with Respect to
8~oom and SimilarlyoSituated
Student Ath letes
The court in Bloom v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association did not evaluate the merits of Jeremy Bloom's
claim.'5 2 The court essentially denied an injunction based on
the NCAA's penalty Restitution Rule.5 3 The decision
resembles historical decisions involving challenges to NCAA
regulations based on the fleeting concept of amateurism in
collegiate athletics. Courts hearing claims of student-athletes
which challenge NCAA regulations as detrimental to student
welfare should characterize the relevant equities and public
interest accordingly; that is, in terms of the student-athlete's
right to a judicial remedy rather than for the protection of an
institution. Otherwise, criticism of the court's unwillingness
to apply true legal analysis due to deference to NCAA
amateurism policies will transform into public outrage
because student-athletes with viable claims are no longer
entitled to their day in court.
With respect to dual-sport student-athletes with the
ability to obtain endorsements derived solely to their
professional endeavors, courts should impose an obligation
on the NCAA to provide a waiver to the absolute prohibition
of endorsements under the Athletics Reputation Rule. Such
an obligation requires the NCAA to treat all dual-sport
athletes equally, whether they are compensated in the form
of a salary or with endorsements.
Jeremy Bloom's legal battle demonstrates that the
Athletics Reputation Rule, as applied to certain dual-sport
athletes, is inconsistent with NCAA rules and policies. The
NCAA's reluctance to provide a waiver cannot be justified by
its effort to prevent competitive inequity. Jeremy Bloom does
not pose any greater threat to competitive equity by retaining
skiing endorsements and modeling contracts than do student-
athletes who earn a salary as professional athletes. The
inability of the court to consider the merits of Bloom's case
reveals a lingering level of deference to the NCAA that
impedes proper adjudication of viable challenges to NCAA
regulations by student-athletes. If the NCAA continues to be
unwilling to accommodate unique student-athletes such as
Jeremy Bloom, courts should not by thwarted by the NCAA's
Restitution Rule to resolve valid claims regarding the true
inequity of NCAA rules. If the NCAA continues to be
inflexible in cases such as Bloom's and with respect to
compensation in general, criticism will continue to mount and
student-athletes will seek redress in courts, state legislatures
and the realm of public opinion.
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